Friday, November 25, 2011

OIL DEAL SCANDAL: THE WAY I SEE IT IN!

I have read Mwenda's articles 'Oil-bribes scandal in historical perspective' as well as other articles in the press and while the arguments may be genuine, the articles may have been written in a rash just like someone asking you how the morning is and you give a litany of bad dreams! Yes, we have had messes but that should never stop an entity to inquire on any allegation. He lists a number of inquiries that have gone wrong and suggests that he was the 'lonely voice' in miscarriage of justice. He may be right on the direction some of them took but to suggest that he was the lonely voice is being insensitive and he seems to give a solution to superficial problems correctly with journalistic honesty! Bad inquiries should never stop attempts for fresh ones nor negate the fact that we have ever had good ones.


 

On the question of this oil scandal now before Parliament; I would agree with Mwenda and others only on face value after looking at the documents. However, I have been privately looking at what could have happened in this scandal and to tell you the truth even as I write my heart goes to those involved: both accused and the people behind the allegations. It is something that hits you on the face and as some have indeed stated there is no smoke without fire but sometimes we may think that thick clouds are smoke and instead of fire you have rainfall.

With that in my mind I set out to privately find out the truth behind this, and what do the documents reveal with some level of mathematical accuracy. I got the documents immediately after the Parliamentary session so you may as well declare me a 'Jonnie come lately' but with an eagle's eye I have studied each line and for days searched for the truthfulness or otherwise of the documents and surprising as it may seem, the revelation is more than what meets the eye!

'Mens rea'-reason of forgery

Forgery is committed for various reasons and can be as elusive as indeed the mind of the fraudster. But in my experience I have never come across a document that is forgery 'proof' mainly because of the fact that any counterfeit must have an original and originator. For example there cannot be a counterfeit for 1000 US$ bill because there is no such a bill and the reason of such forgery would defeat the main purpose of forging which is greed and to cheat. What is the intention of forgery ? Why should a person sit down and forge letters and documents that would literary shake the whole nation and criminalize others? There is a word in law known as "Mens rea"  which is Latin for "guilty mind" and is viewed as one of the ingredients necessary to initiate a forgery or commit a crime. The standard law also has a test for criminal-liability usually expressed also in Latin as: "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea" which means "the act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty". Therefore there can never be forgery (even in this case of Oil-even if the papers were considered falsified) without an intention. The biggest question is who does this benefit and why for example should a person fake Tullow Oil's document and seek out Hon. Onek and Kuteesa among the many? All these are questions I attempt to highlight.


 

History

Three cases stand out as a near perfect forgery in my experience while I worked with IGG up-to 2005. One was a forged UNEB O'Level certificate case that on face value appeared very genuine belonging to a Politician in Western Uganda. She had forged because she wanted to get a certain position that required it at a minimum. When I visited the school the index number was not matching the number of students at that time. Later when I cross checked the serial number(s) on the certificate didn't match the primary UNEB identifiers of that year. Further still the Secretary was not the UNEB Secretary of that time. On face a perfect certificate but close scrutiny was a clear forgery.

Another case involved cheques where one of the principal signatory on the particular account had his signature 'perfectly' duplicated. When he was shown the cheques he agreed that it was his signature. But when he checked the records he remembered that at that period he was on leave out of the country, and the activity in question had been put off. When the issue of the date was brought before the fraudsters; they confessed that they had made this forgery.

The last case involved a Tender Board that stated that it sat on 3rd June 2004 to award a 242 million construction tender to a company that belonged to the Chairperson of the district and at almost double the original cost. What I found later in this near perfect forgery was the issue of dates falling either on weekends or like the above on a known public holiday-Martyr's day.

This brings me to the current debate on the bribery documents. What I did was to study line by line of all key documents and read the meaning as well as interviews from the persons behind the saga; including the Police letters from Malta and United Kingdom by Insp. Maurice Curmi and detective Sergeant Simpson George respectively.

In a series of articles, I will highlight the key features on the letter, transaction records and specifically analyse the places, dates, persons, codes and numbers so as to state that in all probability the records are either valid or not. This has been done in light of the fact that we need to dig out the truth irrespective of the intention of the perpetuators. My write up is therefore based on the face-value of the documents and I intend to give guidance (if necessary and taken) to the Investigators on where to emphasize in order to adequately cover this case. Since am using available public information, I believe this is not to pre-empt any action but rather to encourage more vigilance to the benefit of both parties I guess.

Strictly speaking I don't agree with Andrew Mwenda and others that this should be left as if there are no clues and or affected parties. To leave it would be the highest level of injustice to all parties. Someone should be able to find out whether this indeed is a forgery and possibly the initiator of such, so that in one way or another there is a clear report. If I was one of the accused I would even facilitate the investigation so that I also get to the bottom of this: who is behind spoiling my otherwise good name?


 

Scope and Methodology

The Scope covered only the Transactions that were alleged to have been paid for the period 1st June to 15th August 2010. The analysis is for only the Power of attorney issued by Tullow and subsequently all transactions by cash and to bank accounts belonging to East Africa Development, Hilary Onek. The methodology was mainly through a desk review and critical analysis of the available information on paper. Use of intra and extra networks was also done and contacts to key professionals in banking was made. Nairobi directory was scrutinized to get details of the company and attempts to get passports for the key actors in the saga as well as the declaration forms were futile.

2.0 Findings

The following were preliminary findings:

  1. The letter introducing a one Mr. Brian Glover

The letter titled "LETTER OF POWER OF ATTORNEY TO Mr. Brian Glover" has been treated as exhibit 1 (E1). Note the case for the name is in lower while the rest is capitalized. Is it possible that the name Brian Glover was inserted to help explain power of attorney to some other entity as registered and filed on 1st June 2010? This is a possibility because the Bank seems to have resisted the first filed letter.

  1. Sender

This E1 document has an address of the sender on top stated as that of Tullow Oil in Cape Town South Africa. Is there such an address for the company ? Tullow Oil has an address like the one mentioned as follows: Tullow South Africa (Pty) Ltd; Convention Tower, 11th Floor; Cnr. Heerengracht Street and Coen Steytler Avenue; Foreshore; Cape Town; South Africa Tel: +27 (0) 21 400 7600; Fax: +27 (0) 21 400 7660. The only slight difference is the box number on the letter that does not appear on the website. It is therefore true beyond doubt that the Sender is one and the same. Further still the logo on the letter appears like that of Tullow oil on other key official documents that I have accessed including the Annual reports and their prospectus.

  1. Addressee

It is addressed to a bank in the names of 'Bank of Valletta p.l.c., 58 Zachary Street, Valletta VLT 04, Malta'. Is there such a bank and branch? The finding is that it is also true that there is a bank in the same names and address : Bank of Valletta plc (BOV). Zachary Street 58. MT VLT 04 Valletta - Malta Tel.: + 356 21 31 20 20 - Fax: +356 22 75 37 00. It is therefore true beyond doubt that the Addressee is one and the same bank in Malta and not a fiction.


 

It is addressed to the "Chief Executive Officer" and that person is as well addressed as a "Dear Sir". I set to establish whether the title of the top person in this specific bank is so and whether the gender is male. It was established that one, Mr. Tonio Depasquale is the Chief Executive Officer of the said bank. Not a Bank Manager or a Managing Director but a CEO as stated in the letter. Again beyond doubt the writer and addressee have a high level of accuracy.

  1. Dates

What about the dates? Written on 3rd June 2010, it would be a sham if it was in Uganda because that is a known public holiday (Martyrs day) but in this case it was written from South Africa and it was a Thursday a normal working day there and in Malta. The letter referred: " to the power of attorney registered in your office on the 1st of June 2010,…" which was a Tuesday and also neither a weekend nor a public holiday but a normal working day in both countries i.e Malta and South Africa.

  1. Content

It introduced one Mr. Brian Glover as an authorised person to make payments in cash up to 500,000 Euro (five hundred thousand) to the introduced Representative of East Africa Development Ltd, Sam Kahamba Kutesa born in Sembabule Uganda the 1st of February 1949. It was established that Mr. Brian Glover was at that time the Managing Director Tullow in Uganda. On the other hand Sam Kahamba Kuteesa was indeed born on 1 February 1949 in Sembabule Uganda. He was at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs a post he holds to date.

  1. Sender details

The letter was signed by Aidan Heavey; a separate analysis of a signature of Mr. Aidan Heavey reveals a striking likeness on other key official documents that I have accessed including the Annual reports and the prospectus as a Chief Executive Officer of Tullow Oil plc and that is what he is known to be as well as a founder member.

  1. Registration

On the bottom of E1 is Tullow registration indicating that it was Registered in England and Wales No. 3919249 and Registered Office: 3rd Floor, Chiswick Park, 566 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5XT: All official records confirm this that Tullow Oil plc was incorporated in England and Wales under No. 3919249 on 4th February 2000 in Registered Office 9, Chiswick Park, 566 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5XT. Again beyond doubt the address of registration is that of Tullow with a high level of accuracy.

  1. Conclusion

What does E1 then reveal? That it is not a forgery because all the elements that would constitute a forged documents are not in this particular document. However, if it is a forgery, then it is a perfect one for fraud within Tullow itself. It is clear that it was made in such a way and signed by officials within for a particular purpose that will be reflected on in subsequent posts.

3. The payments

The biggest proof of forged on documents especially concerning payments through the bank is lack of consistency and disparity on places, time, codes as well as misdirected dates in the transactions. One looks for weekends and public holidays and strange codes to prove that there was no transaction at all or falsification of any document. Line by line analysis of Exhibit 2-12 (E2-E12) with E2 and E3 are cash transactions, E4-E7 are payments to East African Development Ltd and E8-E12 to Onek and the following was revealed:

  1. Its address is the bank in the names of 'Bank of Valletta p.l.c., 58 Zachary; Street, Valletta VLT 04, Malta (already mentioned). The logo on the letter appears like that of the bank on other key official documents that I have accessed including the Annual reports and their prospectus on the website. All the documents have a transaction reference number No.: 53243XXX which is different per transaction depending on the date and time as will be shown later. Below the transaction number is the words 'Payment to Third Parties' which indicates that is not to the banker or its agent but to a different party.
  2. It also indicates that it was
    printed by Mr. Brian Glover; which has a confusing revelation because if he is an employee of Tullow Oil: how would he access the bank system to order printing? The only explanation could be if the bank posts electronically all Tullow's transactions and then an authority within prints the transaction. This therefore poses a more serious question on whether it is a bank transaction document or Tullow's. That notwithstanding it further indicates the printing date and time that is ably analysed in the table below. All the documents have a similar document id 72085539 in a way referring that they are of a similar transactional nature to a 'Third party'. Like the document id the source account number was the same throughout i.e 40037242019 (EUR) and here, a reconfirmation must be made on whether Tullow Oil between June and August 2010 ran a Euro account in this bank.
  3. On one hand the beneficiary account numbers were basically two with two cash transactions all in Euros. The first beneficiary account is cited as GB36EFB17800000491740 in EFG Private Bank Ltd; allegedly belonging to East Africa Development Ltd in United Kingdom. Details are as posted in Table 1 below:

    Analysis of Payments Allegedly To East Africa Development Ltd

The following were payments in respect to what is termed as 'other professional fees' to East Africa Development Ltd – Table 1

Date

Time

Day

Invoice

Day

Trans. Ref

Bank

Account

Amount –E

04/06

09:57

Fri

  

53243216

Cash

Cash

500.000

10/06

11:50

Thu

09/06

Wed

53243325

EPGB

17800000491740

1.500.000

21/06

09:40

Mon

18/06

Fri

53243413

EPGB

17800000491740

1.500.000

06/07

14:59

Tue

  

53243534

Cash

Cash

500.000

08/07

11:03

Thu

8/07

Thu

53243716

EPGB

17800000491740

3.500.000

12/07

09:08

Mon

12/07

Mon

53243731

EPGB

17800000491740

5.000.000

12/07

08:08

Mon

16/07

Fri

53243934

EPGB

17800000491740

5.000.000

 

Total

      

17.500.000

  1. Two cash payments are made in London to Glover Brian on Friday 4th June 2010 and Tuesday 06th July 2010. Each is 500,000 Euros and that is the limit in lieu of the Power of Attorney dated 3rd June 2010. Had the amount been beyond that one would outright state that the documents are false. Does the bank own a branch in London to warrant Glover to withdraw from there? This does not matter a lot because of e-banking where clients are served anywhere in the world. The bank's website even indicates how one can be served via the net.
  2. The other beneficiary account was 003450627 in Emirates Bank Ltd; allegedly belonging to Hilary Obaloker Onek in United Arab Emirates. Details are as posted in Table 2, here below and also the payments in respect to what is termed as 'other professional fees' to Hilary Obaloker Onek – Table 2

Date

Time

Day

Invoice

Trans. Ref

Bank

Account

Amount -E

10/06

12:20

Thu

 

53243329

EMB

003450627

500.000

21/06

10:01

Mon

 

53243419

EMB

003450627

500.000

06/07

15:20

Tue

 

53243539

EMB

003450627

500.000

16/07

08:54

Fri

 

53243938

EMB

003450627

1.500.000

05/08

09:34

Thu

 

53243217

EMB

003450627

3.000.000

 

Total

     

6.000.000

  1. The transactions indicate a SWIFT code which in simple terms is a standard format of Bank Identifier Codes (BIC) and is unique identification code for a particular bank. These codes are used when transferring money and messages between banks. A standard SWIFT code consists of 8 or 11 characters. When 8-digits code is given, it refers to the primary office.
    1. First 4 characters – only in letters reflect a bank code
    2. Next 2 characters - only in letters are a country code
    3. Next 2 characters - letters and digits represent the location code
    4. Last 3 characters - letters and digits are a branch code (Primary office) and they are optional
  2. In these documents, the SWIFT Code provided for EFG Private Bank Ltd is EFGBGB2L. The first 4 EFGB stand for the Bank (without the word Private); the second two characters GB stand for Great Britain (modern UK) and the last two are the branch which is 2L (London). The bank's code for all International Bank Wire Transfers to EFG Private Bank Limited is EFGBGB2L
    this code is the same indicated for the Bank's branch located in London, United Kingdom. Again beyond doubt the document reveals that the swift Code matches that of this bank with a very high level of accuracy. Restated simply SWIFT code is a standard format of Bank Identifier Codes (BIC) and it is unique identification and for EFG PRIVATE BANK LIMITED, LONDON, it is EFGBGB2LXXX .
  3. Like the Tullow account in Malta and the beneficiary account number was the same throughout i.e GB36EFG817800000491740 (EUR) and a reconfirmation must be made on whether East Africa Development Ltd. between June and August 2010 operated a Euro account in this bank (EPG).
  4. In the other case the SWIFT Code provided for Emirates Bank Ltd is given as IRVRTUS3N. The first 4 IRVR stand for the Bank and all searches indicate that all Emirates banks have a different code. The second two characters TU stand for a country that is also not available and the last three are the branch which is S3N and was also failed to be located. The swift code left a certain level of doubt on the document revelation given that the swift Code does not match that of the banks in UAE as in Table 3 below:

No

Bank or Institution

City

Branch Name

Swift Code

1

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(AL MAKTOUM ROAD BRANCH)

EBILAEADAMR

2

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(AL SOUK BRANCH)

EBILAEADSUK

3

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(BANDER TALEB BRANCH)

EBILAEADBTA

4

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(BENIYAS SQUARE BRANCH)

EBILAEADBSQ

5

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(DUBAI MAIN BRANCH)

EBILAEADDMB

6

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(GALLERIA BRANCH)

EBILAEADGAL

7

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

GROUP HEAD OFFICE,FINANCE DPT

EBILAEADFIN

8

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(GROUP HEAD OFFICE, TRADE FINANCE SERVICES)

EBILAEADTFS

9

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(HEAD OFFICE)

EBILAEADXXX

10

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(JEBEL ALI BRANCH)

EBILAEADJAZ

11

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(JUMEIRAH BRANCH)

EBILAEADJUM

12

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(KARAMA BRANCH)

EBILAEADKAM

13

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(QIYADAH BRANCH)

EBILAEADQID

14

EMIRATES BANK INTERNATIONAL PJSC

DUBAI

(SATWA BRANCH)

EBILAEADSAT


 

  1. The beneficiary address
    1. For the first transactions the bank address is very clear as EFG Private Bank Limited, located in London, United Kingdom. The Beneficiary address is given as a City and Code of Nairobi and 00691 respectively. As earlier stated East Africa Development Ltd as a registered entity was never traced. But the postal Code given and the city of Nairobi exist. Search for who could have hosted the company became fruitless because it was established that more than 200 companies and entities use this address. Some of them in Nairobi's industrial area are Estate Agents, Oil Companies, Embassies etc. So yes the Code and location exist but no one can confirm the company or physical place unless the bank form is accessed from the paying bank. East Africa Development Ltd as a company remained mysterious in my investigations. Attempts for me to get its contacts or at least papers of registration in Kenya from October 15th to November 17th were futile. But in the case of Anglo Leasing in Kenya and the Goldberg scandal fictitious companies were used in UK to receive millions of United States Dollars.
    2. On the other hand while the Swift Code for payments to Onek was not there the address given of Emirates Bank P.O. Box 2923 Dubai is in existence with the following branches sharing the address and some of them the same telephone: Table 4

Al Aweer , Ras Al Khor Dubai
United Arab Emirates 
Emirates Bank
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-333-3245

Al Qiyadah Branch, Al Ittihad Road
Near Police Head Quarters Al Mulla Plaza Area
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-316-0316

Bander Taleb Branch 
Sheikh Rashid Road
Near Fire Station in Al Ras Area
Phone +971 4-316-0316

Dubai Airport Free Zone, Airport Rd
Transguard Building
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-316-0316

Dubai International Airport Branch 
Airport Road
P.O. Box 2923 
Phone +971 4-224-5327

Dubai Main Branch , Baniyas Road
Opposite Abrra crossing in Deira
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-316-0316

Ibn Battuta Mall 
Sheikh Zayed Road
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-366-9860

Internet City, Sheikh Zayed Road
Building No. 3 Entrance
P.O. Box 2923 Dubai
Phone +971 4-316-0316

So what could this Code represent. Further searches indicate that the Code reflected i.e. IRVRTUS3N is that of New York International Bank. The big question is whether Emirates Bank operates an account there and subsequently if Onek has an account in Emirates Bank with a similar address above. Also like the Tullow account in Malta, the beneficiary account number was the same throughout i.e 0034 450 627 007 (EUR) and a confirmation must be made on whether Hilary Obaloker Onek between June and August 2010 operated a Euro account in this bank.

4. Analysis OF THE Time of payment i.e. Dates; Hour and Days:

  1. It was established that the transactions were carried out on normal working days. Focus was put on weekends and public holidays; for example when 06th July payment was first misread as 7th June, it was noted that in Malta it is a national holiday i.e. Sette Giugno an Italian word for "Seven June that is celebrated annually to commemorate events which occurred on that day in 1919 when, following a series of riots by the Maltese population, British troops fired into the crowd, killing four. On June 7, 1986 the Sette Giugno monument was inaugurated at St. George Square, Valletta. The Maltese Parliament declared the day to be one of the five national days of the island, on March 21, 1989, with the first official remembrance of the day occurred that year (June 7, 1989). Based on the time of payment and invoice making not falling on a weekend and public holiday in Malta (with the highest number in Europe of holidays) again beyond doubt there is a high level of accuracy that the documents are not forgery.
  2. INVOICE DATE AND DAY

    Similarly it was established that invoicing dates for the transactions were done on normal working days. Focus was put on weekends and public holidays and it was established that they were on normal working dates of 2010. On each of EADL's transactions the invoicing was done on each transaction other than what is recorded as cash. On the other hand payments to Dubai are not invoiced and they are recorded as down payment on professional services implying that there was an invoice earlier developed indicating the total amount payable. Again beyond doubt the dates on the invoice reflect that the documents are not forged.

  3. Document ID and Transaction Reference:

It was established that the transactions were carried out using one Document ID number 72085539 which has a high level reflection that the payments are similar. However transaction IDs are different for each document and they are arrayed in order of time of processing. The following table clarifies that indeed this reference is orderly except for one transaction of 05/08/2010 that has a 'wild entry':    Table 5

Date

Time

Day

Trans. Ref

Range

Cum Range

Bank

Account

Amount -E

Payee

04/06

09:57

Fri

53243216

0

0

Cash

Cash

500.000

EADL

10/06

11:50

Thu

53243325

109

109

EPGB

17800000491740

1.500.000

EADL

10/06

12:20

Thu

53243329

4

113

EMB

003450627

500.000

Onek

21/06

09:40

Mon

53243413

84

197

EPGB

17800000491740

1.500.000

EADL

21/06

10:01

Mon

53243419

6

203

EMB

003450627

500.000

Onek

06/07

14:59

Tue

53243534

115

318

Cash

Cash

500.000

EADL

06/07

15:20

Tue

53243539

5

323

EMB

003450627

500.000

Onek

08/07

11:03

Thu

53243716

177

500

EPGB

17800000491740

3.500.000

EADL

12/07

09:08

Mon

53243731

15

515

EPGB

17800000491740

5.000.000

EADL

12/07

08:08

Mon

53243934

203

718

EPGB

17800000491740

5.000.000

EADL

16/07

08:54

Fri

53243938

4

722

EMB

003450627

1.500.000

Onek

05/08

09:34

Thu

53243217

-721

1

EMB

003450627

3.000.000

Onek

From the table above other than the last figure the range indicates a very high level of accuracy within the dates when the transactions took place and the transaction reference. Even when there were similar dates of transaction like on 10/06; 21/06; 06/07 have a range of 4, 6, 5 respectively for a time range period of 21, 30,21 minutes respectively meaning that there are quite many transactions per day averaging 1 transaction per 5 minutes. Note also that on 12th July there were two transactions one at 8.08 having a higher Transaction number than the one at 09:08. The explanation is basically in the invoicing one having been done on 16th July 2010 meaning that it was cleared on 16th hence the small range for the subsequent transaction of 16th July 2011 to Onek.


 

There is a close correlation between the transaction date of 04/06 and 05/08 the range being 1 and the inter-time range being 2 months, 1 day and 23 minutes. The invoice details would be very important to establish whether these transactions never took place the same day and therefore time. In absence of the invoice date on both transactions it is not conclusive on what could have happened given the consistence in transaction reference numbers.


 

5. Other areas of interest

1. Alibi

It would be very interesting to get details of Brian Glover's passport and that of Hon. Sam Kuteesa to see where particularly they were in respect to Cash payments dated 04/06/2010 and 06/07 respectively. A bribe allegation of such amount can either be handed over or banked to a bank account somewhere by the spin masters. If I were Sam Kuteesa I would have already thrown my passport around to prove that during those days I was in Sembabule campaigning! Though that doesn't disprove the allegation but it in a way becomes the beginning of a process of cleansing. Similarly it becomes a trend that after such hefty payments, a person like Onek would travel to make withdraws. His passport would help to see whether there is a direct correlation between his travels and deposit dates.

2. Declarations to the IGG by Sam Kuteesa and Onek Hilary

I am also interested to look at two previous declarations by the Hon members to the IGG especially their foreign accounts and location. This would also bring out the net-worth before June 2010. If somebody got millions of Euros most probably something happened fundamentally from June to date because people are no longer safer with their funds on accounts.

3. Capacity to pay by Tullow:

I reviewed all Tullows financial reports and it is very clear that there is capacity to pay. But on the other hand some of these transactions can be reflected as corporate investments that do not attract Taxes but instead a tax refund. Previously in Britain there was no taxes on ''bribes to African dictators'' but this has long been dispensed off by the OECD declarations and the Bribery Act is in force in Britain that may lead to potential prosecutions.

4. Why Onek and Kuteesa ?

Hon. Onek's case is rather self explanatory because he served as the Minister for Energy & Minerals at the time of the alleged payments. Hon Kuteesa's however is tricky unless if he extorted on the issue of Oil refinery that is directly under his Ministry especially tenders for capacity assessment. However all this could be false if there was a direct intention within to defraud using our Hon ministers names. That is why the truth should not be gagged but rather brought out. Uganda is an infant Oil baron and the allegations can only serve to invite the obvious curse!

6.0 Conclusion on payments

What does E2-12 then reveal? That the documents have a high level of accuracy and that they are not a forgery should not be a question, but could have been made for fraudulent payments either internally or externally may hold water. A cheque may not be forged but it can be used for fraudulent purposes. This is because all the elements that would constitute forged documents are not in these particular document with a very high level of mathematical confidence. However, if they are a forgery, then they are a perfect one for fraud within Tullow itself. It is clear that they were made on clear dates and bank codes that are in existence. I have opened more for all to reflected and I will add on in subsequent posts.

Aidan Heavey

Aidan Heavey was born 1953 and is the Chief Executive Officer of Tullow Oil plc. He is the founder of Tullow Oil and it is one of Europe's largest oil businesses that has extended to Africa especially in Ghana, South africa, Tanzania and Uganda. Aidan is an accountant from Castlerea,Co. Roscommon and educated at Clongowes Wood College in County Kildare and at University College, Dublin. He trained with R. J. Kidney & Co. from 1974 to 1978 when he qualified as an accountant. He left R. J. Kidney & Co. in 1979 to join Aer Lingus as a Financial Controller before joining Tullow Engineering in 1981: it was there that he founded Tullow Oil in 1985 building it through a series of acquisitions into a major international oil business. Aidan's salary at Tullow Oil is £679,450 as of 2010 and his 2009 bonus was £859,274 which is one of the highest for CEOs in the world.


Mr Glover who has served as General Manager for the past three and half years until June 2011, has been appointed to a new position within Tullow's global planning function in London. He has been a key player in the development of Tullow's business in Uganda, overseeing the execution of operations in the Lake Albert Rift Basin.


Sam Kahamba Kutesa is a
renown Ugandan lawyer and politician. He is the current Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Ugandan Cabinet, a position he has held since 13 January 2005. He is also the elected Member of Parliament (MP) for "Mawogola County", Sembabule District.
He was born on 1 February 1949. He is a close associate of President Yoweri Museveni and was previously the Minister of State for Investment, from 2001 until 2005. He holds a Bachelor of law degree 
 (LLB) and a Diploma in Legal Practice LDC. From 1973 to 2001 Sam Kutesa was in private law practice having served as Member of Parliament (MP) for Mbarara North Constituency on the DP ticket between 1980 and 1985. In the short regime between May 1985 to January 1986 of General Tito Okello Lutwa he served as Attorney General. He in 1994 and 1995, became a Constituent Assembly Delegate (CAD) that drafted the 1995 Ugandan Constitution. He was elected MP for Mawogola County in 2001 and was re-elected in 2006 and 2011.


 

Hilary Obaloker Onek  was born on 5 May 1948, is a Ugandan engineer and politician. He is the current Minister of Internal Affairs in the Ugandan Cabinet since may 2011 prior to that, Hilary Onek served as the Minister for Energy & Minerals, before that, he served as Uganda's Minister of Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries from 2006 to 2009. He is also the elected Member of Parliament (MP) representing Lamwo County, Lamwo District. He was first elected to Parliament in 2001.

Hilary Onek attended his primary school on MorotoKaramoja. He attended St. Mary's College Kisubi for both his "O" & "A" Level education, from 1965 until 1970. From 1971 until 1974, Onek attended Makerere UniversityUganda's oldest university, graduating with the degree of Bachelor of Science (BSc) in Civil Engineering. He proceeded to the People's Friendship University in MoscowRussia, where he studied from 1974 until 1979, graduating with the Masters of Science (MSc) in Engineering, majoring in Water Resources & Hydro-technical Structural Engineering. He returned as a consultant and Lecturer of MUK

In 1982, he was appointed Chief Engineer at National Water and Sewerage Corporation, a parastatal water and sewerage utility. He was promoted to Managing Director of NWSC in 1983.He served as Managing Director of NWSC until 1998. Hillary Onek is also a businessman. He is the proprietor of Bomah Hotels in Kitgum and Gulu.


 

By Jasper T. Mpiriirwe, November 2011 (Statistician who worked with IGG for 7 years and former Coordinator ACCU, currently a Masters student at UCU and a private Consultant)


 

No comments: